Traditional government structures are sometimes regarded as overly bulky. However, with the rapid expansion of interconnected computer networks and the progressive development of Information Technology (IT), it is now possible to exchange massive amounts of data at light speed over great distances. These infrastructure and technology provide the opportunity for governments to transform themselves from huge monsters to compact and efficient organizations. Realizing the potential benefits of IT, as far as 2004's summer 198 governments had started their e-government plans to construct digital government based on the Internet (West, 2004) .
INTRODUCTION
Traditional government structures are sometimes regarded as overly bulky. However, with the rapid expansion of interconnected computer networks and the progressive development of Information Technology (IT), it is now possible to exchange massive amounts of data at light speed over great distances. These infrastructure and technology provide the opportunity for governments to transform themselves from huge monsters to compact and efficient organizations. Realizing the potential benefits of IT, as far as 2004's summer 198 governments had started their e-government plans to construct digital government based on the Internet (West, 2004) .
One of the essential features of e-government is the transmission of confidential information via computer networks. Depending on the sensitivity of the information, the security of some information should be treated at the same level as national security. Although each e-government has its own networks, no government can say no to the Internet because it would be a waste of resource. However, the Internet is an open environment, protecting the data flowing on the Internet from attacks is therefore a pressing e-government issue. 2 All governments with such strategies have sought help from cryptographers and devoted huge amounts of both money and time to the development of specially designed information systems and advanced cryptosystems to strengthen information security. Unfortunately, cryptography is not adequate in some applications. As computing power keeps increasing and the techniques of cryptanalysis keep advancing, contemporary cryptosystems cannot and will not work forever. At the 24th
Annual International Cryptology Conference (CRYPTO'04), MD5 and a series of related cryptosystems, which are currently in widespread use, were proved unreliable (Wang et al., 2004) .
From the last decade, steganology -the technique for digitally hiding and detecting information is attracting more attention. It is already regarded as a powerful complement to cryptology and a promising technique for ensuring e-national security.
Unlike cryptology, which renders the encrypted information completely meaningless, steganology keeps the host media perceptually unchanged after hiding the secret information. This article will provide an in-depth explanation of the two components of steganology, namely steganography and steganalysis, and discuss their potential applications in the realm of e-national security.
STEGANOGRAPHY
Markus Kahn (1995) defined steganography as "the art and science of communicating in a way which hides the existence of the communication. In contrast to cryptography, 3 where the enemy is allowed to detect, intercept and modify messages without being able to violate certain security premises guaranteed by a cryptosystem, the goal of steganography is to hide messages inside other innocent messages in a way that does not allow any enemy to even detect that there is a second message present". This definition has been widely accepted within the information security community.
The application of steganography can be traced back to ancient times. In 499 B.C., Histiaus shaved the head of his most trusted slave and tattooed an important message on his scalp. When the slave's hair grew back, the information was concealed and the slave was sent to Aristagoras, who then shaved the slave's head again to reveal the message, which instructed him to revolt against the Persians (Herodotus, 1992) . That probably is the oldest instance of steganography. As the technique improved, invisible ink and microfilm emerged in the modern applications.
The watermark on bank notes is the most common contemporary instance of steganography.
In the modern world, steganography is a covert communication technology, which allows secret information to be hidden in cover message / media. The resultant message with the hidden information is called the stego message. Steganographic techniques can be divided into two broad categories: digital watermarking and digital fingerprinting. Digital watermarking focuses on the embedding algorithms and is used for purposes of copyright protection, authentication, and integrity verification. The hidden information, namely the watermark, in digital watermarking is relatively 4 simple, normally the digital signature of the owner or a random pattern generated with a secret key. Digital fingerprinting concentrates on the method (sometimes referred to as protocol) of generating the hidden information, namely the fingerprint, so as to meet requirements such as uniqueness and counterfeit-proofness. Fingerprinting techniques always utilize watermarking techniques to embed the generated fingerprint.
In other words, the essential difference between these two categories is that the fingerprint embedded by fingerprinting techniques is unique for every single copy of the cover message, while the watermark used by watermarking techniques is always the same for all the copies of the cover message and is related to the cover message and its owner. Different schemes of these two categories also have other special features to meet the specific needs of their applications.
Some other common properties of steganography techniques are as follows:
Transparency: The distortion introduced by the embedding process should be imperceptible to humans so that the impact on the perceptual quality is minimized.
Robustness:
For most applications such as copyright protection, the survivability against all kinds of malicious attacks and incidental manipulations, such as lossy compression and format trans-coding, should be maintained unless the manipulations have rendered the content useless in some sense.
Payload: Payload (i.e., the embedding capacity) is important for digital fingerprinting. Since the function of the fingerprint is to identify the individual recipient / buyer, the fingerprint should be long enough to provide space to keep the 5 uniqueness when a huge number of copies of the cover message are to be distributed.
In this case, embedding capacity is the deterministic factor of an effective fingerprinting scheme (Su, Eggers & Girod, 2000) .
Digital Watermarking
The idea of digital watermarking is to embed a small amount of secret informationthe watermark -into the host media to achieve goals like copyright assertion, authentication, and content integrity verification, etc. The superiority of digital watermarking over cryptography is that the latter provides no protection after the content is decrypted while the former provides 'intimate' protection at all times because the watermark has become an inseparable constituent part of the host media after embedding. All the capabilities of a watermarking scheme, including the balance between the transparency and robustness to avoid any perceptible artefacts and the other properties to meet its special application, are all dependant on the design of the embedding algorithm. To optimise performance, the embedding algorithm is always specially designed for a certain type of media, such as image, video, audio, etc., to avoid any possible security gap. Digital watermarking schemes can be classified into three categories: robust watermarking, semi-fragile watermarking and fragile watermarking.
Robust watermarking is intended for the applications of copyright protection and Digital Rights Management (DRM) wherein the watermark containing copyright 6 information should be detectable after attacks that aim at erasing the watermark but maintaining the value of the host media. Cox et al. (1997) proposed the concept of Spread-Spectrum (SS) watermarking, which has inspired a great number of recent works in this fields. Adopted from communication theory, the idea of SS watermarking is to treat the low-energy watermark as a narrow-band signal and spread it into multiple components in the spectrum of the host media, which is treated as a wide-band signal. By spreading the watermark in the spectrum, the energy of the watermark in a signal frequency is limited, and thus the robustness is guaranteed even when some frequency components are missing. However, the high robustness of SS watermarking is gained at the expense of low payload, so it is not quite suitable to the purpose of digital fingerprinting. To further improve the robustness, without causing more artefacts, Human Perceptual Models (HPM), including Human Visual System (HVS) and Human Auditory System (HAS), have been proposed and incorporated in the watermark embedding process (Barni, Bartolini & Piva, 2001) . Feasible perceptual models facilitate adaptive watermark embedding in the components where HPM is less sensitive.
Semi-fragile and fragile watermarking have been developed for the purposes of authentication and content integrity verification, in which the embedded watermark is expected to be destroyed when the attacks are mounted, so that the alarm will be raised by the detector when it fails to extract the watermark. The difference between these two sub-categories is that semi-fragile watermarking regards some 7 designer-specified operations as non-malicious actions while fragile watermarking treats all kinds of manipulations as malicious. Counterfeit-proofness is a key objective (semi-)fragile watermarking schemes are expected to achieve. Counterfeiting attacks, such as cut-and-paste, vector quantization attack, and transplantation attack are about replacing regions / segments in the watermarked media with fake patches / segments. This problem can be solved through correlating adjacent regions / segments of the media during the embedding process so that neighbours of the replaced regions / segments will raise the alarm in the verification process when the original regions are missing. Methods of establishing neighbourhood dependency / correlation can be found in (Li & Yang, 2003; Si & Li, 2004) .
While there are many watermarking schemes for images, audio, and video, schemes for text are relatively scarce. Unfortunately, text is the dominating type of data in e-governments. Some published schemes, such as those developed by Huang & Yan (2001) , focus on modifying the formations of the digital documents, such as font size, line spacing, and layout. These modifications are imperceptible to human eyes but can still be detected by the decoder even after being printed and photocopied several times. However, this type of scheme depends on the formations of the documents so much that re-typing the text is always an effective, albeit awkward, attack. Attackers with an Optical Character Recognition (OCR) system, which scans and digitizes printed documents, in their arsenal will find that defeating the security of watermarked textual documents is a trivial task. Much more effort needs to be 8 expended therefore in order to increase levels of security in this area.
Digital Fingerprinting
A digital fingerprint is a unique pattern / message to be embedded in the host media for identifying the recipient. Digital fingerprinting cannot resist illegal copying, but it enables the copyright owners or media distributors to trace the recipients who leak or redistribute the fingerprinted media.
This section begins with a discussion of some of the terms used in the description of fingerprinting (Boneh & Shaw, 1998) . A mark is a position in the host media, which can take one of k values, and a fingerprint is a collection of l marks. Therefore a total of k · l fingerprinted copies of the host media can be produced. A distributor provides legal copies with different fingerprints to the users, and a traitor is a user who illegally redistributes his/her fingerprinted copy to potential attacker(s).
The main vulnerability of digital fingerprinting schemes is the possibility of a collusion attack in which a sufficiently large number of the fingerprinted copies are collected to detect some marks that differ in more than one of the collected copies.
Based on those detected marks, the strength of fingerprints can be attenuated by averaging the values of the marks so as to create a new copy that carries no trace of the colluders' identities. Therefore, an additional requirement for digital fingerprinting is anti-collusion, which means that even after the attackers have gathered a sufficient number of legal copies, they still cannot detect and attenuate the 9 fingerprints. More technical details about this process can be found in (Trappe, 2003; Celik, Sharma & Tekalp, 2004) .
Digital fingerprinting is applicable in the areas of traitor tracing and anonymity protection. The idea of traitor tracing is quite straightforward (Chor et al., 2000) .
Confidential data are all secured with access control and any one who has the right to access the data must have his/her identity or password known to the central system.
The central system could generate the fingerprint according to this identity and embed the fingerprint into the copy before encrypting the data and allowing the fingerprinted data to be retrieved or sent via the networks. Should the fingerprinted data be leaked, the traitor could be traced by checking the fingerprint. Another extended application of this idea is document distribution tracing. As we know, sending a sensitive document through a channel to the destination / recipient should follow a process of recording and monitoring. To prevent forged documents being distributed through the channel, every unit / node in the channel should embed its fingerprint on the passing document, and the next unit verifies all the fingerprints that the document should carry.
If all are present, this document is deemed authenticated; if not, it is forged and the source can be traced back based on the present fingerprints. Given the fact that embedding capacity is limited, the problem of the above idea is that when too many fingerprints are embedded into one media, the response of every fingerprint at the detector may be reduced below the threshold so that they cannot be recognized.
Another problem is in distinguishing the embedding sequence of the fingerprints.
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Ongoing research is expected to perfect this application however.
Voting is an important vehicle for ascertaining public opinion. Concerns surrounding the efficiency, accuracy, and justice of traditional elections based on paper ballots have always existed. To overcome those problems, electronic voting systems have been undergoing development for some years. However, the potential impact of security breaches of electronic voting systems is far greater than with traditional voting systems. The use of fingerprinting could be of considerable significance in mitigating these concerns however. A case similar to electronic voting is anonymous reporting which helps governments to fight against corruption and crime. The shared property of these two cases is that people do not want to reveal their identities and the government has to ensure that the anonymous action is trustable and non-malicious. Pfitzmann and Waidner (1997) introduced the idea of anonymous fingerprinting. A third party, namely a registration centre, informs the government of its signature, and the anonym has to register with this centre in a registration protocol in which he/she must prove his/her identity and get a certificate from the centre. This certificate is registered in the centre but contains no publicly derivable information about the holder. During the voting or reporting, the anonym and the government interact in a multiparty protocol: the anonym has to present his/her certificate signed by the centre and gets a fingerprinted receipt; the government generates the fingerprint from the anonym's certificate and keeps the fingerprint as proof, but in fact knows nothing about the real identity of the anonym.
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If further verification is needed however, the government could extract the certificate from the fingerprint and show it to the registration centre as proof of the corresponding identity. More advanced anonymous techniques can be found in (Pfitzmann & Sadeghi, 2000; Choi, Sakurai & Park, 2003) .
STEGANALYSIS
Functioning like the traditional government, an e-government also has the responsibility of monitoring public data flow. Currently, most governments believe that limiting the strength of public cryptosystems or banning them completely is adequate to ensure national security. For instance, the U.S. government restricted Microsoft Co. to selling their Internet Explorer software with the highest encryption levels (128-bit) before relaxing export controls in 2000. Another example is that PGP, a successful cryptosystem, was also banned by the U.S. government at one time. From the point of view of a government, this may be a reasonable step to take as far as national security is concerned. However, it leaves the majority of Internet users exposed to privacy breaches. This situation drives the public to resort to steganography for their privacy protection. Because steganography works in such an imperceptible way, the governments will have to face many difficulties in detecting covert communications. The consequence of failing to detect covert communications among international terrorists, for example, could be disastrous. So steganalysis, which is the opposite of steganography, may be even more important than 12 steganography from the perspective of e-national security.
Steganalysis is the art and science of detecting or interfering with covert communications, which exploit steganographic techniques. Steganalysis includes three stages: seeking suspicious features, extracting the hidden message, and destroying the message. While developing steganalysis algorithms for a specific steganographic scheme is possible, there is no systematic theory or general steganalysis technique available yet. The reader is referred to (Chandramouli, 2003; Chandramouli & Subbalakshmi, 2004) for the latest information about steganalysis.
CONCLUSION
We have discussed the properties, roles, and applications of steganology in e-national security in this article. Currently, the lack of attention being paid to steganology, especially steganalysis, by governments is a serious problem. This has dangerous implications in terms of both traditional national security and e-national security.
While the benefits of steganography should be fully exploited, malicious uses of steganography should also be tackled through steganalysis. Compared to the rapid development of steganography, the slow progress of steganalysis is unsatisfactory and therefore more government support is necessary. Cryptology and steganology together function to protect different facets of a nation's security. Integrating the two disciplines is certainly a significant step toward better security against unwanted operations and higher privacy protection in our complex and ever-changing world.
TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Digital Watermarking: A method of embedding secret information (watermark) into host media for the purposes of copyright protection, authentication, content integrity verification, etc.
Steganology:
The theories and techniques for information hiding. Steganology encompasses two opposite components-steganography and steganalysis.
Steganography:
The techniques and theories of hiding secret information in host media without introducing perceptible distortion.
Steganalysis:
The art and science of detecting or interfering with covert communications, which exploit steganographic techniques.
Robust Watermarking: A category of digital watermarking, which requires the 16 embedded watermark to be robust enough to survive any manipulations no matter whether it is malicious or not. Because of its robustness, digital watermarking schemes are widely used in the applications of Digital Rights Management (DRM) and Intellectual Property Protection (IPP).
Fragile Watermarking: A category of digital watermarking, which requires the embedded watermark to be un-extractable after any manipulation on the watermarked media. It is widely used in the applications of authentication and content integrity verification.
Digital Fingerprinting:
The techniques of generating a unique fingerprint for each copy of a host media and embedding the fingerprint into a copy using the robust watermarking techniques. Because of the uniqueness of the fingerprint, digital fingerprinting can be used for tracing and identifying copyright pirates.
Collusion Attack: A coalitional act of removing digital fingerprints. It is based on the idea that both the position and the content of the fingerprint embedded in every fingerprinted legal copy are different. If the attacker obtains a large enough number of legal copies, he/she can garner sufficient knowledge about the positions of the fingerprints by comparing all the copies such that they could then arbitrarily modify the information on the positions so as to fool a fingerprint detector.
